home libri books ebook dvd e film top ten sconti 0 Carrello


Torna Indietro

schofield norman - architects of political change

Architects of Political Change Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory




Disponibilità: Normalmente disponibile in 15 giorni
A causa di problematiche nell'approvvigionamento legate alla Brexit sono possibili ritardi nelle consegne.


PREZZO
35,98 €
NICEPRICE
34,18 €
SCONTO
5%



Questo prodotto usufruisce delle SPEDIZIONI GRATIS
selezionando l'opzione Corriere Veloce in fase di ordine.


Pagabile anche con 18App Bonus Cultura e Carta del Docente


Facebook Twitter Aggiungi commento


Spese Gratis

Dettagli

Genere:Libro
Lingua: Inglese
Pubblicazione: 06/2006





Trama

This work offers a set of extended interpretations of Madison's argument in Federalist X of 1787, using ideas from social choice theory and from the work of Douglass North, Mancur Olson, and William Riker. Its focus is not on rational choice theory itself, but on the use of this theory as a heuristic device to better understand democratic institutions. The treatment adapts a formal model of elections to consider rapid constitutional change at periods when societies face quandaries. The topics explored in the book include Britain's reorganization of its fiscal system in the eighteenth century to prosecute its wars with France; the Colonies' decision to declare independence in 1776; Madison's argument about the 'probability of fit choice' during the Ratification period of 1787-88; the argument between Hamilton and Jefferson in 1798–1800 over the long run organization of the US economy and the election of Lincoln in 1860.




Sommario

Preface; 1. Constitutional quandaries and rational choice; 2. Power, prosperity and social choice; 3. Franklin and the War of Independence: 1776-1783; 4. Madison, Jefferson and condorcet; 5. Lincoln and the Civil War; 6. Johnson and the critical realignment of 1964; 7. Keynes and the Atlantic constitution; 8. Preferences and beliefs; 9. Political change; 10. Notes; 11. Figures and tables.




Prefazione

This analysis builds on earlier theoretical work by Mancur Olson, William Riker and Douglass North. Professor Schofield emphasizes that under some conditions architects of political change can put a new perspective on societal quandaries, such that societies can choose an option that has a better 'probability of a fit choice'.




Autore

Norman Schofield is Taussig Professor of Political Economy at Washington University in St. Louis. He has served as Fulbright Distinguished Professor of American Studies at Humboldt University Berlin in 2003–04, a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford in 1988–89, and Shrman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the California Institute of Technology in 1983–84. Professor Schofield is the author of Mathematical Methods in Economics and Social Choice (2003), Multiparty Government (coauthored with Michael Laver, 1990), and Social Choice and Democracy (1985). He received the William Riker Prize in 2002 for contributions to political theory and is co-recipient with Gary Miller of the Jack L. Walker Prize for the best article on political organizations and parties in the American Political Science Review for 2002–04.







i libri che interessano a chi ha i tuoi gusti





Altre Informazioni

ISBN:

9780521539722

Condizione: Nuovo
Collana: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Dimensioni: 230 x 18 x 154 mm Ø 461 gr
Formato: Brossura
Illustration Notes:8 tables
Pagine Arabe: 354






Per noi la tua privacy è importante


Il sito utilizza cookie ed altri strumenti di tracciamento che raccolgono informazioni dal dispositivo dell’utente. Oltre ai cookie tecnici ed analitici aggregati, strettamente necessari per il funzionamento di questo sito web, previo consenso dell’utente possono essere installati cookie di profilazione e marketing e cookie dei social media. Cliccando su “Accetto tutti i cookie” saranno attivate tutte le categorie di cookie. Per accettare solo deterninate categorie di cookie, cliccare invece su “Impostazioni cookie”. Chiudendo il banner o continuando a navigare saranno installati solo cookie tecnici. Per maggiori dettagli, consultare la Cookie Policy.

Impostazioni cookie
Accetto tutti i cookie
X