The Value Gap

In The Value Gap, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen addresses the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for, two value notions that are central to ethics and practical deliberation. The first part of the book argues against views that claim that one of these notions is either faulty, or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. Whereas these two views disagree on whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed or dependent concept, it is argued, as against both approaches, that goodness and goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be fully understood in terms of one another. The second part provides an analysis of good and good-for in terms of a fitting-attitude analysis. By elaborating a more nuanced understanding of the key elements of this analysis—reasons and pro-attitudes—Rønnow-Rasmussen challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas. The result is that the gap between favouring for a reason what is good and favouring for a reason what is good for someone appears insurmountable.

1 - Value Taxonomy
2 - Good and Good-For
3 - Challenging Value Monism
4 - Challenging Good Monism
5 - Good-For Unitarianism
6 - Fitting-Attitude Analysis
7 - The Logical Consequence of Fitting Attitudes
8 - The Fitting-Attitude Analysis Revised
9 - 'Sake'
10 - FA and Motivating Reasons
11 - Favourings for No Reason
12 - Mind the Value Gap

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen is a Professor and Acting Chair in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Lund University. In 2015, he was elected member of Academia Europea. He is the author of Personal Value (OUP, 2011), and has more recently published articles on moral progress, fitting-attitude analysis, intrinsic and extrinsic value, pro- and contra-attitudes, reasons, and on the metaethical view that he calls on-conditionalism.