Bayesian Epistemology

Probability theory is increasingly important to philosophy. Bayesian probabilistic models offer us ways of getting to grips with fundamental problems about information, coherence, reliability, confirmation, and testimony, and thus show how we can justify beliefs and evaluate theories. Bovens and Hartmann provide a systematic guide to the use of probabilistic methods not just in epistemology, but also in philosophy of science, voting theory, jurisprudence, and cognitive psychology.

1 - Information
2 - Coherence
3 - Reliability
4 - Confirmation
5 - Testimony

Stephan Hartmann is Chair of Philosophy of Science at LMU Munich, Alexander von Humboldt Professor, and Co-Director of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP). From 2007 to 2012 he worked at Tilburg University, The Netherlands, where he was Chair in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science and Director of the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS). Before moving to Tilburg, he was Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and Director of LSE's Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. His primary research and teaching areas are philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, formal epistemology, and social epistemology.