Why Nations Fight Past and Future Motives for War

Four generic motives have historically led states to initiate war: fear, interest, standing, and revenge. Using an original data set, Richard Ned Lebow examines the distribution of wars across three and a half centuries and argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, only a minority of these were motivated by security or material interest. Instead, the majority are the result of a quest for standing, and for revenge - an attempt to get even with states who had previously made successful territorial grabs. Lebow maintains that today none of these motives are effectively served by war - it is increasingly counterproductive - and that there is growing recognition of this political reality. His analysis allows for more fine-grained and persuasive forecasts about the future of war as well as highlighting areas of uncertainty.

Part I. Introduction: 1. Introduction; 2. Theories of war; Part II. War in the Past: 3. Theory and propositions; 4. Data set and findings; Part III. War in the Future: 5. Interest and security; 6. Standing and revenge; Part IV. Conclusion: 7. Conclusion; Appendix: data set.

Richard Ned Lebow provides an analysis of the historical causes and consequences of war. He argues that war should become less frequent in the future because territorial conquest has become more difficult and costly, reducing the incentive to make war for material rewards.

Richard Ned Lebow is James O. Freedman Presidential Professor at Dartmouth College and Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Among other books, he is the author of A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2008) which won the 2009 American Political Science Association Jervis and Schroeder Award for the Best Book on International History and Politics as well as the British International Studies Association Susan Strange Book Prize for the Best Book in International Studies, and The Tragic Vision of Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2003) which won the 2005 Alexander George Book Award of the International Society for Political Psychology.