The Tet Offensive A Brief History with Documents

The Tet Offensive is widely considered to be a turning point of the Vietnam War. From that point forward, although the campaigns included in the Offensive were crushing defeats for the Communist forces, the U.S. support for the war dwindled. Although defeated militarily, the Communists did effectively manipulate media influence, propaganda, and popular opinion to sway the outcome of their military objectives. Through primary sources, collected together for the first time, William Thomas Allison explores the Tet Offensive through political, military, and public lenses, including the Vietnamese perspective, to give students and scholars a well-rounded view of the events.

With Americans turning against the war in ever greater numbers, struggles for power between the government and the military, and no end in sight to the fighting, the Tet Offensive of 1968 proved to be the turning point of the Vietnam War. In The Tet Offensive, historian William Thomas Allison provides a clear, concise overview of the major events and issues surrounding the Tet Offensive, and compiles carefully selected primary sources to illustrate the complex military, political, and public decisions that made up Tet. The Tet Offensive is composed of two parts: an accessible, well-illustrated narrative overview, and a collection of core primary source documents. Throughout the narrative, historiographic questions are addressed within the text to highlight discussion among historians over pivotal points of debate. The objectively selected documents provide students with raw material from which to gain insight into these events through their own analysis, and to improve their ability to discuss and understand the importance of historical scholarship. Approachable and insightful, The Tet Offensive is not only a great introduction to reading history through primary sources, it is an essential tool for understanding what made the Tet Offensive such an important turning point of the Vietnam War.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

List Illustrations

List of Abbreviations

Chronology

Part 1

Introduction

Background – The Situation before Tet

The American Political and Military Context

The South Vietnamese Political and Military Context

The North Vietnamese Political and Military Context

North Vietnamese Planning and Objectives

Historiographic Point – What was the purpose of the Tet Offensive?

The Tet Campaign

The Border Battles

Historiographic Point – Did American intelligence fail in
predicting the Tet Offensive?

The Battle of Khe Sanh

Historiographic Point – What was the purpose of the
North Vietnamese attack against the outpost at Khe Sanh?

Tet Begins

The Battle for Saigon

Historiographic Point – What was the impact of the attack
on the U.S. Embassy?

Tet across South Vietnam

The Battle for Hue

The Aftermath of Tet

The Request for More Troops

Public Opinion

A Change of Policy

Historiographic Point – What was the role of the media in
the Tet Offensive?

The Impact of Tet

On the NLFPLAF

On North Vietnam

On South Vietnam

On the United States

Historiographic Point – Was Tet the Turning Point of the Vietnam War?

Notes for Part I

Part 2 - Documents

Document 1: JUSPAO Field Memorandum Number 31 –
A Vietnamese Looks at Tet, November 28, 1966

Document 2: Memorandum from the Special Assistant for
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (DePuy) to the
Director, Joint Staff (Goodpaster), September 8, 1967

Document 3: Address on Vietnam before the National Legislative
Conference, San Antonio, Texas, September 29, 1967

Document 4: Memorandum from the President’s Assistant (Jones) to
President Johnson – Meeting of the Wise Men, November 2, 1967

Document 5: Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the
Department of State, November 22, 1967

Document 6: Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Deputy Commander,
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Abrams), November 25, 1967

Document 7: Telegram from General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV,
to General Wheeler, CJCS, December 10, 1967

Document 8: Information Memorandum from the President’s Special
Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, December 16, 1967

Document 9: U.S., Puppets, to Sabotage Holiday Cease-Fire on Liberation
Radio in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, December 18, 1967

Document 10: Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 20, 1968

Document 11: Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Johnson,

January 29, 1968

Document 12: Telegram from the Commander of the Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Forces (Sharp) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Wheeler), January 30, 1968

Document 13: Notes of Meeting, January 30, 1968

Document 14: Intelligence Memorandum, January 31, 1968

Document 15: Interrogation of Ngo Van Giang, January 28-January 31, 1968

Document 16: Interrogation of Mguyen Van Sau, January 28-January 31 1968

Document 17: Telegram from General Westmoreland, COMSUMACV to
General Wheeler, CJCS, February 1, 1968

Document 18: Telegram from the Commander, Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler), February 1, 1968

Document 19: Memorandum from William J. Jorden of the National Security
Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow),
February 3, 1968

Document 20: Telegram from the Commander, Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces
(Sharp), February 3, 1968

Document 21: Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of
State, February 4, 1968

Document 22: Telegram from General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, to
General Wheeler, CJCS, February 4, 1968

Document 23: Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, February 6, 1968

Document 24: Notes of Meeting, February 7, 1968

Document 25: Notes of Meeting, February 9, 1968

Document 26: Telegram from the Commander, Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Command (Sharp) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Wheeler), February 12, 1968

Document 27: Notes of Meeting, February 12, 1968

Document 28: After Action Report, 716^th Military Police Battalion,
February 12, 1968

Document 29: PLAF Command Salutes 20-Day Fight in Hue over Liberation
Radio (South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces Command’s
message to the armed forces and people of Hue), February 21, 1968

Document 30: Memorandum from the Ambassador’s Special Assistant
(Lansdale) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker), February 27, 1968

Document 31: Notes of Meeting, February 27, 1968

Document 32: Walter Cronkite on CBS News, February 27, 1968

Document 33: Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 1, 1968

Document 34: Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)
to President Johnson, March 6, 1968

Document 35: Telegram from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp),
March 8, 1968

Document 36: President Johnson’s Remarks to Delegates to the National
Farmers Union Convention in Minneapolis, March 18, 1968

Document 37: Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and
Secretary of Defense Clifford, March 20, 1968

Document 38: Letter from 2^nd Lieutenant Ray Smith, USMC, to
Captain Batcheller, USMC, March 25, 1968

Document 39: Medal of Honor Citation for Sergeant Alfredo Gonzales,
United States Marine Corps

Document 40: President Johnson's Address to the Nation, March 31, 1968

Document 41: Report on Operation Bigbuild, c. July 1968

Bibliography