The Many Moral Rationalisms

Moral rationalism takes human reason and human rationality to be the key elements in an explanation of the nature of morality, moral judgment, and moral knowledge. This volume explores the resources of this rich philosophical tradition. Thirteen original essays, framed by the editors' introduction, critically examine the four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason, (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori, and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. The five essays in Part I ('Normativity') offer contemporary defences or reconstructions of Kant's attempt to ground the normative thesis, that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action, in the nature of practical reason and practical rationality. The four essays in Part II ('Epistemology & Meaning') consider the viability of claims to a priori moral knowledge. The authors of all four essays are sympathetic to a realist moral metaphysics, and thus forgo the straightforward constructivist road to apriority. The four essays in Part III ('Psychology') each grapple with the implications for rationalism of the role of emotions and unconscious processes in moral judgement and action. Together the essays demonstrate that moral rationalism identifies not a single philosophical position but rather a family of philosophical positions, which resemble traditional rationalism, as exemplified by Kant, to varying degrees.

1 - Introduction
2 - Humanity as an End in Itself
3 - Three Kinds of Moral Rationalism
4 - Constitutivism about Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding
5 - Constructing Practical Normativity
6 - Moral Requirements and Permissions, and the Requirements and Permissions of Reason
7 - Reasons and Justifiability
8 - Rationalist Metaphysics, Semantics and Metasemantics
9 - Naturalistic Moral Realism, Rationalism,and Non-Fundamental Epistemology
10 - The Motivating Power of the A Priori Obvious
11 - Stupid Goodness
12 - What Does it Take to Act for Moral Reasons?
13 - Towards a Trajectory-Dependent Model of (Human) Rational Agency
14 - The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment

Karen Jones is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. She received her PhD from Cornell University. She has written extensively about trust, what it is, and when it is justified. She also writes on moral epistemology, the emotions, and rationality. Much of her work is from a feminist perspective. Francois Schroeter is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Melbourne, which he joined in 2003 after spending time at the University of Michigan and the ANU. He has written widely on metaethics and moral psychology.