The period covered by this book, 1954-60, witnessed a significant change in Allied strategy for the Middle East. Its focus switched from Egypt to the states of the so-called northern tier of the Middle East: Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. Allied planning focused now on holding up a future Soviet offensive against the Middle East at the strategic passes that cut through the Zagros mountains, across the Iraqi-Iranian border. This was to be done with the indigenous ground forces of the northern tier states, complemented by Allied strategic and tactical nuclear bombing.
In 1955, the Baghdad Pact became the political expression of the new strategy. The economic and strategic interests of the West in the Middle East provide the context for the tumultuous events of this period: the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954 for the evacuation of Egypt; the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955; the Suez Crisis which, together with the escalating Arab-Israeli conflict, erupted into open war in November 1956; and finally, the crises that rocked the Middle East in July 1958: the fall of the Hashemite dynasty and the ancient regime in Iraq, and the British and American military interventions in Jordan and the Lebanon respectively.
These last events constituted the final act in a drama that had begun in 1955. They effectively marked the end of the Allies' 'northern tier' strategy. In the spring of 1959 Iraq seceded from the Baghdad Pact, and the rump was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENT). This book reveals the extent to which the UK clung on to great-power pretensions and used bluff, even deception, in order to give the impression that she disposed of greater military resources thanwas in fact the case. It describes not only Anglo-American tensions in the Middle East, but also the Americans' reluctance to take over Britain's former hegemony in the region. Finally, it reveals the extent to which the Allies' relationship with Israel was a constant restrai
