Reasons for Action

What are our reasons for acting? Morality purports to give us these reasons, and so do norms of prudence and the laws of society. The theory of practical reason assesses the authority of these potentially competing claims, and for this reason philosophers with a wide range of interests have converged on the topic of reasons for action. This volume contains eleven essays on practical reason by leading and emerging philosophers. Topics include the differences between practical and theoretical rationality, practical conditionals and the wide-scope ought, the explanation of action, the sources of reasons, and the relationship between morality and reasons for action. The volume will be essential reading for all philosophers interested in ethics and practical reason.

1. Introduction David Sobel and Steven Wall; 2. Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality Michael Bratman; 3. Reasons: practical and adaptive Joseph Raz; 4. The explanatory role of being rational Michael Smith; 5. Practical competence and fluent agency Peter Railton; 6. Practical conditionals James Dreier; 7. Authority and second-personal reasons for acting Stephen Darwall; 8. Promises, reasons, and normative powers Gary Watson; 9. Regret and irrational action Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson; 10. Mackie's motivational argument Philip Clark; 11. The truth in ecumenical expressivism Michael Ridge; 12. Voluntarist reasons Ruth Chang.

This 2009 volume contains eleven essays on practical reason. Topics include the differences between practical and theoretical rationality, the explanation of action, the sources of reasons, and the relationship between morality and reasons for action. The volume will be essential reading for all philosophers interested in ethics and practical reason.