Realism and the Aim of Science From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery

Popper formulates and explains his non-justificationist theory of knowledge. Science--empirical science--aims at true explanatory theories, yet it can never prove, finally establish, or justify any of its theories as true, not even if it is in fact a true theory. Science must continue to question and criticize all its theories, even those which happen to be true.

Realism and the Aim of Science is one of the three volumes of Karl Popper’s Postscript to the Logic of scientific Discovery. The Postscript is the culmination of Popper’s work in the philosophy of physics and a new famous attack on subjectivist approaches to philosophy of science. Realism and the Aim of Science is the first volume of the Postcript. Popper here formulates and explains his non-justificationist theory of knowledge: science aims at true explanatory theories, yet it can never prove, or justify, any theory to be true, not even if is a true theory. Science must continue to question and criticise all its theories, even those that happen to be true. Realism and the Aim of Science presents Popper’s mature statement on scientific knowledge and offers important insights into his thinking on problems of method within science.

Editor's Foreword Acknowledgements Introduction, 1982 REALISM AND THE AIM OF SCIENCE Preface, 1956 Part I: The Critical Approach Chapter I Induction Chapter II Demarcation Chapter III Metaphysics: Sense of Nonsense? Chapter IV Corroboration Part II: The Propensity Interpretation of Probability Chapter I Objective and Subjective Probabilities Chapter II Criticism of Probabilistic Induction Chapter III Remarks on the Objective Theories of Probability Index

Karl Popper, W.W. Bartley III