Putting Metaphysics First Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology

The metaphysical part of this book is largely concerned with realism issues. Michael Devitt starts with realism about universals, dismissing Plato's notorious 'one over many' problem. Several chapters argue for a fairly uncompromising realist view of the external physical world of commonsense and science. Both the nonfactualism of moral noncognitivism and positivistic instrumentalism, and deflationism about truth, are found to rest on an antirealism that is hard to characterize. A case is presented for moral realism. Various biological realisms are considered. Finally, an argument is presented for an unfashionable biological essentialism. The second part of the book is epistemological. Devitt argues against the a priori and for a Quinean naturalism. The intuitions that so dominate 'armchair philosophy' are emipirical not a priori. Throughout the book there is an emphasis on distinguishing metaphysical issues about what there is and what it's like from semantic issues about meaning, truth, and reference. Another central theme, captured in the title, is that we should 'put metaphysics first'. We should approach epistemology and semantics from a metaphysical perspective rather than vice versa. The epistemological turn in modern philosophy, and the linguistic turn in contemporary modern philosophy, were something of disasters.

1 - "Ostrich Nominalism" or "Mirage Realism"?
2 - Aberrations of the Realism Debate
3 - Underdetermination and Commonsense Realism
4 - Scientific Realism
5 - Incommensurability and the Priority of Metaphysics
6 - Global Response Dependency and Worldmaking
7 - The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism
8 - The Metaphysics of Truth
9 - Moral Realism: A Naturalistic Perspective
10 - Natural Kinds and Biological Realisms
11 - Resurrecting Biological Essentialism
12 - Naturalism and the A Priori
13 - No Place for the A Priori
14 - Intuitions
15 - On Determining What There Isn't

Michael Devitt (PhD Harvard, BA Sydney) is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He taught at the University of Sydney from 1971 until 1987 and the University of Maryland from 1988 to 1999. His main research interests are in the philosophy of language and mind, and in issues of realism.