Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention

This book examines the lessons of the U.S.-Soviet experiment with detente in the 1970s, with particular attention to the effort to develop a basis for cooperating in crisis prevention.- The authors, less concerned with who was to blame for the failure of détente than with understanding the flaws in its conceptualization and implementation, have joined efforts to analyze the difficulties the two superpowers experienced in their attempt to avoid dangerous confrontations and crises that would damage the overall detente relationship. The book includes case studies of several Middle East conflicts, the Angolan crisis of 1975, the Rhodesian conflict, the Ogaden war of 1977-1978, the abortive U.S.-Soviet talks on limitation of conventional arms transfers to third areas, and the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. It also provides an analysis of preventive diplomacy as a strategy for mediating third-area conflicts and avoiding superpower confrontations and offers guidelines for reshaping U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and for moderating competition for influence in the Third World.

Also of Interest -- Preface -- Introduction -- Détente: The Search for a "Constructive" Relationship -- Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy -- Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-1972: Unalterable Antagonism or Collaborative Competition? -- The Basic Principles Agreement of 1972: Origins and Expectations -- The Kremlin and Détente: Soviet Conceptions, Hopes, and Expectations -- The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: Origins and Impact -- The African Terrain and U.S.-Soviet Conflict in Angola and Rhodesia: Some Implications for Crisis Prevention -- Missed Opportunities for Crisis Prevention: The War of Attrition and Angola -- The Ogaden War: Some Implications for Crisis Prevention -- Negotiated Limitations on Arms Transfers: First Steps Toward Crisis Prevention? -- Crisis Prevention in Cuba -- Why Détente Failed: An Interpretation -- The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts -- Crisis Prevention Reexamined