Fittingness Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity

Fittingness explores the nature, roles, and applications of the notion of fittingness in contemporary normative and metanormative philosophy. The fittingness relation is the relation in which a response stands to a feature of the world when that feature merits, or is worthy of, that response. In the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, this notion of fittingness played a prominent role in the theories of the period's most influential ethical theorists, and in recent years it has regained prominence, promising to enrich the theoretical resources of contemporary theorists working in the philosophy of normativity. This volume is the first central discussion of the notion of fit to date. It is composed of seventeen new essays covering a range of topics including the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relation between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility. In addition to making important contributions to the debates in the philosophy of normativity with which they're concerned, the essays in the volume support the hypothesis that the notion of fittingness has great theoretical utility in investigating a range of normative matters, across a variety of domains.

1 - Fittingness: A User's Guide
2 - The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting
3 - Against the Fundamentality of Fit
4 - What Is Evaluable for Fit?
5 - Fitting Emotions
6 - Intuitions of Fittingness
7 - Reasons and Fit
8 - Value-First Accounts of Reasons and Fit
9 - Feasibility and Fitting Deliberation
10 - In Defense of the Right Kind of Reason
11 - Value and Idiosyncratic Fitting Attitudes
12 - Well-Being as Fitting Happiness
13 - The Things We Envy: Fitting Envy and Human Goodness
14 - Response-Dependence and Aesthetic Theory
15 - Fittingness as a Pitiful Intellectualist Trinket?
16 - Blame's Commitment to Its Own Fittingness
17 - Making Amends: How to Alter the Fittingness of Blame

Rach Cosker-Rowland is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Leeds. She is the author of The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value and Moral Disagreement. Christopher Howard is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at McGill University. He works primarily in ethics. His research has been published in leading philosophy journals including, among others, Ethics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, and Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.