Fear of Knowledge Against Relativism and Constructivism

The academic world has been plagued in recent years by scepticism about truth and knowledge. Paul Boghossian, in his long-awaited first book, sweeps away relativist claims that there is no such thing as objective truth or knowledge, but only truth or knowledge from a particular perspective. He

demonstrates clearly that such claims don't even make sense. His short, lucid, witty book shows that philosophy provides rock-solid support for common sense against the relativists, and will prove provocative reading throughout the discipline and beyond.

Relativist and constructivist conceptions of truth and knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. In his long-awaited first book, Paul Boghossian critically examines such views and exposes their fundamental flaws. Boghossian focuses on three different ways of reading the claim that knowledge is socially constructed - one as a thesis about truth and two about justification. And he rejects all three. The intuitive, common-sense view is that there is a way the world is that is independent of human opinion; and that we are capable of arriving at beliefs about how it is that are objectively reasonable, binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence regardless of their social or cultural perspective. Difficult as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that philosophy has uncovered powerful reasons for rejecting them. This short, lucid, witty book shows that philosophy provides rock-solid support for common sense against the relativists. It will prove provocative reading throughout the discipline and beyond.

1 - Introduction
2 - The Social Construction of Knowledge
3 - Constructing the Facts
4 - Relativizing the Facts
5 - Epistemic Relativism Defended
6 - Epistemic Relativism Rejected
7 - The Paradox Resolved
8 - Epistemic Reasons and the Explanation of Belief