Contents: Series preface; Introduction. The Selection and Retention of Judges: Senate voting on Supreme Court nominees: a neoinstitutional model, Charles M. Cameron, Albert D. Cover and Jeffrey A. Segal; The politics of Supreme Court nominations: a theory of institutional constraints and choices, Brian J. Moraski and Charles R. Shipan; Constituent influence in State Supreme Courts: conceptual notes and a case study, Melinda Gann Hall. Judicial Decision Making: Divisions of opinion among justices of the US Supreme Court, C. Herman Pritchett; On the mysterious demise of consensual norms in the United States Supreme Court, Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein and William J. Dixon; The study of judicial decision-making as an aspect of political behavior, Glendon A. Schubert; Sophisticated voting and gate-keeping in the Supreme Court, Gregory A. Caldiera, John R. Wright and Christopher J.W. Zorn; Predicting Supreme Court cases probabilistically: the search and seizure cases, Jeffrey A. Segal; Voting behavior in the United States Courts of Appeals 1961-64, Sheldon Goldman; Judicial policy-making and southern school segregation, Michael W. Giles and Thomas G.Walker,; Civic virtue and the feminine voice in constitutional adjudication, Suzanna Sherry; What do judges and justices maximize? (the same thing everybody else does), Richard A. Posner; Strategic policy considerations and voting fluidity on the Burger Court, Forrest Maltzman and Paul J, Wahlbeck. Constraints on Judicial Power: Lower court checks on Supreme Court power, Walter F. Murphy; Judicial partisanship and obedience to legal doctrine: whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller; Overriding Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions, William N. Eskridge Jr; The logic of strategic defection: court-executive relations in Argentina under dictatorship and democracy, Gretchen Helmke. The Role of Courts in Democracies: Decision-making in a democracy: the supreme court as a na