Constitutional Change under Autocracy

With the majority of the global population still living under surprisingly stable autocratic regimes, we can assume that regime stability is the ultimate objective of autocratic leadership. However, this stability is continually challenged, so autocrats deploy various instruments to defend their hegemonic power. Constitutional Change under Autocracy examines one such instrument, the strategic use of constitutional amendments to reinforce regime stability. Through a large-N comparative analysis and illustrative case studies of Azerbaijan, Mexico, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), this book demonstrates that constitutional amendments are far more than technical legal adjustments. Instead, they serve as deliberate tools for consolidating power, managing internal rivalries, and mitigating external threats. By enhancing - or attempting to enhance-regime legitimacy, these amendments can play a pivotal role in stabilizing autocratic regimes. Insightful and analytical, this book reflects on the implications of the instrumentalization of law and challenges our expectations about the role of constitutions under autocracy.

1 - Introduction
2 - A Theory of Constitutional Change under Autocracy
3 - Why Are Autocratic Constitutions Amended?
4 - Strategic Constitutional Amendments and Autocratic Succession in Azerbaijan
5 - Threats from the Opposition: Religion, the State, and the PRI in Mexico
6 - Reinterpreting Nationhood under Threat from the Outside: The GDR's 1974 Constitutional Amendment
7 - Conclusion

Dr Anna Fruhstorfer is Principal Investigator of the ERC funded LOOPS project on the logistics of protest camps in competitive authoritarian regimes at Freie Universität Berlin and the WZB. Her research focuses on explaining autocratic (in)stability from the perspectives of protest and social movements, elite conflict, and legal norms.