Consciousness

This book presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to undercut dualistic accounts of qualitative states. Other topics include visual awareness, visual appearances, emotional qualia, and meta-cognitive processing. This important work will interest a wide readership of students and scholars in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

1. Form of consciousness; 2. Theories of qualia; 3. Awareness, representation, and experience; 4. The refutation of dualism; 5. Visual awareness and visual qualia; 6. Ouch! The paradox of pain; 7. Internal weather: the metaphysics of emotional qualia; 8. Introspection and consciousness; 9. A summary, two supplements, and a look beyond.

This book provides interrelated accounts of six main forms of consciousness - agent consciousness, propositional consciousness (consciousness that), introspective consciousness, relational consciousness (consciousness of), experiential consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness. This important book will interest a wide readership of students and scholars in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

Christopher S. Hill is Professor in Philosophy at Brown University. His past publications include Sensations (Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Thought and World (Cambridge University Press, 2002).