Algorithmic Game Theory 18th International Symposium, SAGT 2025, Bath, UK, September 2–5, 2025, Proceedings

This volume constitutes the refereed proceedings of 18th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2025, held in Bath, UK, during September 2–5, 2025.

The 26 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 68 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows:Computational and Algorithmic Aspects of Games; Facility Location; Fair Division and Resource Allocation; Markets and Matching; Bayesian Decision Making; Mechanism Design and Algorithmic Contracts and Computational Social Choice.

.- Computational and Algorithmic Aspects of Games.
.- On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization inZero-Sum Matrix Games under Noisy Feedback.
.- On the Effect of Time Preferences on the Price of Anarchy.
.- Mixed Nash Equilibria in Discrete Tullock Contests.
.- Social Welfare in Battery Charging Games.
.- Improved Hardness Results for the Clearing Problem in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps.
.- Coordination Mechanisms on Unrelated Machines with Arbitrary Priority Lists.
.- Facility Location.
.- Constant-Approximate and Constant-Strategyproof Two-Facility Location.
.- Constrained Truthful Obnoxious Two-Facility Location with Optional Preferences.
.- Hotelling-Downs with Facility Synergy: The Mall Effect.
.- Fair Division and Resource Allocation.
.- Tractable Graph Structures in EFX Orientation.
.- Fairness under Equal-Sized Bundles: Impossibility results and Approximation Guarantees.
.- Online Fair Division for Personalized 2-Value Instances.
.- A new lower bound for multi-color discrepancy with applications to fair division.
.- When is Truthfully Allocating Chores no Harder than Goods?.
.- Markets and Matching.
.- Unsolvability and Beyond in Many-To-Many Non-Bipartite Stable Matching.
.- Course Allocation with Credits via Stable Matching.
.- Bayesian Decision Making.
.- Bayesian Optimal Stopping with Maximum Value Knowledge.
.- Persuading Agents in Opinion Formation Games.
.- A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured Events.
.- Mechanism Design and Algorithmic Contracts.
.- Deterministic Refund Mechanisms.
.- Near-Linear MIR Algorithms for Stochastically-Ordered Priors.
.- Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions.
.- Linear Contracts for Supermodular Functions Based on Graphs.
.- Computational Social Choice.
.- Distortion of Multi-Winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison Rule.
.- Metric Distortion under Group-Fair Objectives.
.- Robustness of voting mechanisms to external information.