The Tet Offensive

TRAMA

The Tet Offensive is widely considered to be a turning point of the Vietnam War. From that point forward, although the campaigns included in the Offensive were crushing defeats for the Communist forces, the U.S. support for the war dwindled. Although defeated militarily, the Communists did effectively manipulate media influence, propaganda, and popular opinion to sway the outcome of their military objectives. Through primary sources, collected together for the first time, William Thomas Allison explores the Tet Offensive through political, military, and public lenses, including the Vietnamese perspective, to give students and scholars a well-rounded view of the events.

NOTE EDITORE

With Americans turning against the war in ever greater numbers, struggles for power between the government and the military, and no end in sight to the fighting, the Tet Offensive of 1968 proved to be the turning point of the Vietnam War. In The Tet Offensive, historian William Thomas Allison provides a clear, concise overview of the major events and issues surrounding the Tet Offensive, and compiles carefully selected primary sources to illustrate the complex military, political, and public decisions that made up Tet. The Tet Offensive is composed of two parts: an accessible, well-illustrated narrative overview, and a collection of core primary source documents. Throughout the narrative, historiographic questions are addressed within the text to highlight discussion among historians over pivotal points of debate. The objectively selected documents provide students with raw material from which to gain insight into these events through their own analysis, and to improve their ability to discuss and understand the importance of historical scholarship. Approachable and insightful, The Tet Offensive is not only a great introduction to reading history through primary sources, it is an essential tool for understanding what made the Tet Offensive such an important turning point of the Vietnam War.

SOMMARIO

Table of Contents Acknowledgements List Illustrations List of Abbreviations Chronology Part 1 Introduction Background – The Situation before Tet The American Political and Military Context The South Vietnamese Political and Military Context The North Vietnamese Political and Military Context North Vietnamese Planning and Objectives Historiographic Point – What was the purpose of the Tet Offensive? The Tet Campaign The Border Battles Historiographic Point – Did American intelligence fail in predicting the Tet Offensive? The Battle of Khe Sanh Historiographic Point – What was the purpose of the North Vietnamese attack against the outpost at Khe Sanh? Tet Begins The Battle for Saigon Historiographic Point – What was the impact of the attackon the U.S. Embassy? Tet across South Vietnam The Battle for Hue The Aftermath of Tet The Request for More Troops Public Opinion A Change of Policy Historiographic Point – What was the role of the media inthe Tet Offensive? The Impact of Tet On the NLFPLAF On North Vietnam On South Vietnam On the United States Historiographic Point – Was Tet the Turning Point of the Vietnam War? Notes for Part I Part 2 - Documents Document 1: JUSPAO Field Memorandum Number 31 – A Vietnamese Looks at Tet, November 28, 1966 Document 2: Memorandum from the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (DePuy) to the Director, Joint Staff (Goodpaster), September 8, 1967 Document 3: Address on Vietnam before the National LegislativeConference, San Antonio, Texas, September 29, 1967 Document 4: Memorandum from the President’s Assistant (Jones) toPresident Johnson – Meeting of the Wise Men, November 2, 1967 Document 5: Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, November 22, 1967 Document 6: Telegram From the Commander, Military AssistanceCommand, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Deputy Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Abrams), November 25, 1967 Document 7: Telegram from General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, to General Wheeler, CJCS, December 10, 1967 Document 8: Information Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, December 16, 1967 Document 9: U.S., Puppets, to Sabotage Holiday Cease-Fire on Liberation Radio in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, December 18, 1967 Document 10: Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 20, 1968 Document 11: Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Johnson, January 29, 1968 Document 12: Telegram from the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces (Sharp) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (Wheeler), January 30, 1968 Document 13: Notes of Meeting, January 30, 1968 Document 14: Intelligence Memorandum, January 31, 1968 Document 15: Interrogation of Ngo Van Giang, January 28-January 31, 1968 Document 16: Interrogation of Mguyen Van Sau, January 28-January 31 1968 Document 17: Telegram from General Westmoreland, COMSUMACV to General Wheeler, CJCS, February 1, 1968 Document 18: Telegram from the Commander, Military AssistanceCommand, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff (Wheeler), February 1, 1968 Document 19: Memorandum from William J. Jorden of the National SecurityCouncil Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow),February 3, 1968 Document 20: Telegram from the Commander, Military Assistance Command,Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces (Sharp), February 3, 1968 Document 21: Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, February 4, 1968 Document 22: Telegram from General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, to General Wheeler, CJCS, February 4, 1968 Document 23: Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, February 6, 1968 Document 24: Notes of Meeting, February 7, 1968 Document 25: Notes of Meeting, February 9, 1968 Document 26: Telegram from the Commander, Military Assistance Command,Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (Sharp) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler), February 12, 1968 Document 27: Notes of Meeting, February 12, 1968 Document 28: After Action Report, 716th Military Police Battalion, February 12, 1968 Document 29: PLAF Command Salutes 20-Day Fight in Hue over Liberation Radio (South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces Command’smessage to the armed forces and people of Hue), February 21, 1968 Document 30: Memorandum from the Ambassador’s Special Assistant (Lansdale) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker), February 27, 1968 Document 31: Notes of Meeting, February 27, 1968 Document 32: Walter Cronkite on CBS News, February 27, 1968 Document 33: Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 1, 1968 Document 34: Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)to President Johnson, March 6, 1968 Document 35: Telegram from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp), March 8, 1968 Document 36: President Johnson’s Remarks to Delegates to the National Farmers Union Convention in Minneapolis, March 18, 1968 Document 37: Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Clifford, March 20, 1968 Document 38: Letter from 2nd Lieutenant Ray Smith, USMC, to Captain Batcheller, USMC, March 25, 1968 Document 39: Medal of Honor Citation for Sergeant Alfredo Gonzales, United States Marine Corps Document 40: President Johnson's Address to the Nation, March 31, 1968 Document 41: Report on Operation Bigbuild, c. July 1968 Bibliography

ALTRE INFORMAZIONI

• Condizione: Nuovo
• ISBN: 9780415956802
• Dimensioni: 9 x 6 in Ø 1.15 lb
• Formato: Copertina rigida
• Illustration Notes: 5 tables and 18 halftones
• Pagine Arabe: 170
• Pagine Romane: xviii