Rationality Through Reasoning

NOTE EDITORE

When we believe that we ought to do something, our belief very often motivates us to do it. But how does this happen? Offering a unique theory on the subject, Rationality Through Reasoning argues that it can occur through the process of reasoning, which is a means by which we are able to motivate ourselves. In the course of building his argument about motivation, the author develops a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning. His account of reasoning -- both theoretical and practical -- is principally aimed at showing how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens within us. In addition, the book discusses what distinguishes correct from incorrect reasoning, and argues that we can improve our rationality by means of the activity of correct reasoning. This book presents a theory of rationality and normativity that differs significantly from the majority of existing philosophical thinking. In developing its comprehensive argument, it covers topics that include ought, reasons, responding to reasons, the logic of requirements, the structure of theoretical and practical rationality, the nature and correctness of reasoning, the role of language in reasoning, and much else.

SOMMARIO

Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thought Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else. Offers a new answer to the motivation question of how a normative belief motivates an action.

ALTRE INFORMAZIONI

• Condizione: Nuovo
• ISBN: 9781118656051
• Collana: The Blackwell / Brown Lectures in Philosophy
• Dimensioni: 229 x 21 x 152 mm Ø 544 gr
• Formato: Brossura
• Pagine Arabe: 322