Oxford Studies in Metaethics

NOTE EDITORE

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

SOMMARIO

1 - Fitting Action2 - Enticing Emotions3 - Non-Naturalist Moral Causation4 - Non-Naturalism without Contingentism5 - Capturing Disagreement from the First-Person Perspective6 - Intelligibility, Idealism, and Alienation in Post-Kantian Metaethics7 - Exclusionary Reasons and the Balancing View of Ought8 - Reason Judgments-Political or Motivational?9 - Moral Worth beyond Right Reasons10 - Resisting the New Contextualist Orthodoxy in Metaethics11 - Moral Justification12 - The Predictive Explanationist Argument for Moral Skepticism

AUTORE

Russ Shafer-Landau is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of Moral Realism: A Defence (OUP, 2003), which received an honourable mention for the 2005 APA Book Prize, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (OUP, 2004), and The Fundamentals of Ethics (OUP, 2009).

ALTRE INFORMAZIONI

• Condizione: Nuovo
• ISBN: 9780197903599
• Collana: Oxford Studies in Metaethics
• Dimensioni: 216 x 138 mm
• Formato: Copertina rigida
• Pagine Arabe: 320