Consciousness and its Objects

NOTE EDITORE

Colin McGinn presents his latest work on consciousness in ten interlinked essays, four of them previously unpublished. He extends and deepens his controversial solution to the mind-body problem, defending the view that consciousness is both ontologically unproblematic and epistemologically impenetrable. He also investigates the basis of our knowledge that there is a mind-body problem, and the bearing of this on attempted solutions. McGinn goes on to discuss the status of first-person authority, the possibility of atomism with respect to consciousness, extreme dualism, and the role of non-existent objects in constituting intentionality. He argues that traditional claims about our knowledge of our own mind and of the external world can be inverted; that atomism about the conscious mind might turn out to be true; that dualism is more credible the more extreme it is; and that all intentionality involves non-existent objects. These are all surprising positions, but he contends that what the philosophy of mind needs now is 'methodological radicalism' - a willingness to consider new and seemingly extravagant ideas.

SOMMARIO

1 - What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem?2 - How Not to Solve the Mind-Body Problem3 - Solving the Philosophical Mind-Body Problem4 - What Is It Not Like to be a Brain?5 - Consciousness and Space6 - Consciousness, Atomism, and the Ancient Greeks7 - Consciousness and Cosmology: Hyperdualism Ventilated8 - The Problem of Philosophy9 - Inverted First-Person Authority10 - The Objects of Intentionality

ALTRE INFORMAZIONI

• Condizione: Nuovo
• ISBN: 9780199267606
• Dimensioni: 211 x 18.7 x 140 mm Ø 413 gr
• Formato: Copertina rigida
• Pagine Arabe: 264