The Terrorists of Iraq Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency 2003-2014, Second Edition

The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency 2003-2014, Second Edition is a highly detailed and exhaustive history and analysis of terror groups that both formed the Iraq insurgency and led to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It places heavy emphasis on the history, organization, and personalities of the al-Qaeda in Iraq (now ISIS), the former Baathist regime loyalists, and Shiite insurgents. The book also thoroughly analyzes how Iraq became the center of the ISIS strategy to create an Islamic caliphate in the heart of the Middle East. As terrorism activity proliferates and spreads globally, this timely second edition provides a solid understanding of how the Iraq insurgency was a born after the U.S.-led invasion, which led to the crisis of today. More specifically, the book: Illustrates the political, combat, and religious strategy as well as street-level tactics of the insurgents Reveals what American, British, and coalition soldiers endured in Iraq on the street every day for eight years, and what the Iraqi army and people now endure Demonstrates how the Iraqis employ very specific terrorist acts at particularly auspicious times to meet their strategic political or propaganda goals during a terror campaign Delineates strategies that the enemy saw as critical in forcing U.S. and coalition forces to withdraw, and the terrorist strategy that besieges the Shiite government that was left behind Includes three new chapters on the evolution of ISIS from al-Qaeda in Iraq (2011-2014), a revised history of al-Qaeda in Iraq (2005-2011), and updated geopolitical intelligence predictions The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency 2003-2014, Second Edition offers an unbiased examination of the myriad of Iraqi terror groups and the goal of expanding the Islamic State across the Middle East. The bookshares knowledge that will hopefully limit the killing machine that is the Iraq insurgency and someday bring about a stable partner in the Middle East.

Acknowledgments About the Author Introduction Section I: Preparation for Insurgency Who Is Fighting in Iraq? The Cornerstone of Terror: The Ex-Ba’athist Loyalists The Iraqi Resistance Movement and the Foreign Mujahideen Introducing al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Fighting Misperceptions Endnotes Victory through Defeat: Saddam Plans for Insurgency Repeating a Very Bad History? Unambiguous Indicators The Prewar Insurgency Plan The Iraqi War Plan: Embracing Defeat Mogadishu on the Tigris Treated as Liberators? Endnotes Crucible of the Insurgency: The Fedayeen Goes to War First Line of Defense—The Air Defense Forces Second Line of Defense—The Iraqi Army Third Line of Defense—The Republican Guard Last Line of Defense—The Paramilitary Irregulars, Terrorists, and Special Republican Guard The Saddam Fedayeen (Firqah al-Fidayi Saddam) Commander of the Saddam Fedayeen—Uday Hussein The Professional Terrorists Arrive—Tawhid Wal-Jihad and al-Qaeda The Fedayeen Become Terrorists Invasion and S-VBIEDs—Introduction of the Suicide Car Bomb to Iraq The Fedayeen Disperse Endnotes Victory from the Jaws of Defeat: Launching the Iraq Insurgency Implementing the Insurgency The Second "1920 Revolution" Leading the Resistance—Lt. Gen. Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri Godfathers of the Insurgency—The Prewar Internal Intelligence Apparatus Commander of the Security Apparatus—Qusay Hussein Special Security Organization—SSO (Hijaz al-Amn al-Khas) Special Republican Guard Operational Command of the SRG SRG Combat Units Iraqi Intelligence Service—IIS (al-Mukahbarat) Director of Foreign Intelligence (M4) Directorate of Technical Affairs (M4/4/5) Directorate of Counterintelligence (M5) Directorate of Clandestine Operations (M13) Directorate of Special Operations Department (M14-SOD) Directorate of Signals Intelligence (M17) Directorate of Surveillance (M20) Al Ghafiqi Project Division (M21) Directorate of Opposition Group Activities (M40) Directorate of General Security—DGS (Amn al-‘Amm) Directorate of General Military Intelligence—DGMI (Mudiriyah al-Istikhbarat al-‘Askriah al-‘Ammah or Istikhbarat) Directorate of Military Security—DMS (Amn al-Askaria) The DMS Special Operations Unit 999 Former Regime Loyalist Insurgent Groups Organization National Command of the Islamic Resistance—Unified Mujahideen Command (NCIR-UMC) NCIR-UMC Senior Command Regional Commands FRL Insurgent Roles and Responsibilities Local Terror Cells/Groups (Insurgent Brigades) Financing the Insurgency Endnotes The Insurgent’s Strategy The FRL Long-Range Strategy Military Strategy of the Insurgency Strategic Phases of the Insurgency Mission Accomplished: The Primary Goal of the Insurgency Was Breaking the Will of the American People Tactical Goals How Many Insurgents Were There? An Enemy without Gains or Losses Estimate of the Core Insurgency, 2003–2011 The Original Number and Experience of the Core Cadres Doing the Math Terrorist Brigades or Terrorist Battalions? Size and Roles of the Insurgent Cells FRL Cells Iraqi Religious Extremist Cells Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Foreign Fighters AQI Cell Composition (2003–2011) Insurgent Casualties Endnotes Section II: Knife Fight in a Phone Booth—Bringing on the Insurgency Bringing It On The FRLs Organize The FRLs Destroy the Evidence First Strikes of the After-War Mission Accomplished CPA Order No. 1—You’re Fired Phase 1: The Kill Campaign "This Is Not a Resistance Movement" "Bring Them On" Phase 2: The Humiliation Campaign Enter the Islamic Extremists The Insurgency Explodes Phase 3: The Punishment Campaign The Anti-Shiite Clerics Campaign The FRL Anti-Human Intelligence Campaign Phase 4: The Inspire Campaign Endnotes Insurgent Weapons and Tactics Looting the Arsenals The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Daisy Chain IEDs Super IEDs Explosively Formed Projectile IEDs The WMD Program’s High Explosives The Suicide Bomber The Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (S-VBIED) Poison Gas Attacks by Chemical S-VBIEDs The Suicide Pedestrian-Borne IED (S-PBIED) Small Arms—Rifles, Pistols, and Machine Guns Night Observation Devices Sniper Weapons Systems Antitank Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) Mortars—Indirect Fire Weapons Artillery and Ground-Fired Aerial Rockets MANPADS—Man-Portable Air Defense Systems Other Anti-Air Weapons: Heavy Machine Guns, Aerial IEDs, and Pigeon Clapping Derelict Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) Endnotes "Jihad Is the Only Way …" Iraqi Islamic Extremists—Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Sunnah: The Islamic Army in Iraq and Others Ansar al-Islam ("Partisans of Islam") AAI Organization Military Committee Military Operations and Tactics Links to al-Qaeda Ties to Iran Operation Viking Hammer AAI Strategy AAI in European Terrorism Ansar al-SunnAH and Jaysh al-Ansar al-Sunnah ("Supporters/Partisans of the Sunni/Army of the Supporters of the Sunni") AAS Military Committee Al-Muhajirin Wa al-Ansar The Islamic Army in Iraq IAI Tactics Iraqi Resistance Brigades and Battalions, Terror Cells, and Subunits Other Minor Iraqi Insurgent Groups Media and Communiqués Endnotes Al-Qaeda and the Foreign Terrorists in Iraq Arrival of the "Ghost" The First Commander of AQI—Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (a.k.a. Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, Ahmad Fadhil al-Khalayla, Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh) AQI Strategic Organization Al-Zarqawi vs. bin Laden: AQI’s Strategy and Goals Al-Qaeda Strategy for the Use of Terrorism Tactical Objectives of AQI Cells Tactical Goals of AQI Cells AQI In-Country Organization AQI Command Staff and Leadership Group (C&L)—Iraq/Syria Tactical Organization Logistics and Safe Houses AQI Weapons AQI Tactics in Iraq Direct Martyrdom Attacks Foreign Mujahideen Groups in Iraq Foreign Mujahideen Groups and Cells in Iraq Transiting Syria, 2003–2011: The Expressway to the Jihad Profile of AQI Operatives and Foreign Fighters in Iraq Saudi Operatives Iraqis in AQI The European Jihadists The Black Widows of Iraq—AQI Female Operatives Unto Death—Married Couple Suicide Bombers Endnotes Section III: A New Jihad (2004–2011): Bin Laden’s Greatest Gift Fallujah: The Crucible of the Iraq Jihad The April 2004 Revolution Operation Valiant Resolve and the Two-Front War Could It Get Any Worse? The Mahdi Militia and the Shiite Uprising Losing Anbar The Hostage War and the Transition to Sovereignty Black Thursday—The One-Day Salafist Mini-Jihad Endnotes Stepping on Mercury November 2004—Showdown at Fallujah Operation Phantom Fury Resistance in Fallujah Withdraws Shock and Awe Jihadist Style—The S-VBIED War The Jihad Reaches Out—AQI Attacks in Jordan Ending al-Zarqawi Endnotes Section IV: No Longer a Wounded Lion: AQI to ISIS (2006–2014) Al-Qaeda’s Lonely Road to Recovery The Metamorphosis from AQI to the Islamic State of Iraq (2006–2011) Formation of the Real Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) The Syria Civil War—An Opportunity for a Safe Haven and a Nation Endnotes Lions of God: ISIS and the Islamic Caliphate (2013–2014) The al-Baghdadi-Zawahiri Clash The Winter Offensive of 2013–2014: ISIS Decapitation Attack on Syrian Resistance The Inter-al-Qaeda Civil War Starts Operation Lion of God al-Bilawi Phase 1: The Campaign to Seize Western Iraq ISIS Final Declaration of Independence from al-Qaeda’s Corporate Management Team Operation Lion of God al-Bilawi Phase 2: Taking Mosul, Anbar, and Central Iraq Mission Accomplished: ISIS Style Breaking Bad: ISIS Finally Breaks from al-Qaeda Central The New Islamic Caliphate Endnotes Internal Organization of the ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (the Levant) (ISIS/ISIL (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham)) and the Islamic State Caliphate (ISC) Command and Leadership Apparatus Leadership Organization Caliph of the Islamic State Caliphate and Amir al-Mujahideen ("Prince of the Holy Warriors") Deputy Amir (Naieb al-Amir al-Mujahideen) Political/Religious Organization State of Iraq Advisory Council (Shura al-Dawlat al-Iraq) ISIS Military Council Past Commanders Military Council Members Internal Security Apparatus (Jehaz al-Amn al-Dakili) Manpower Pool Women Operativ

Malcolm W. Nance is a counterterrorism and intelligence consultant for the US Special Operations, Homeland Security, and Intelligence agencies, with more than 33 years of experience in combatting radical extremism. An honorably retired Arabic-speaking US Navy intelligence collections operator, field interrogator, and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape specialist, he spent two decades on clandestine antiterrorism and counterterrorism intelligence operations in the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa in support of the Special Operations and Intelligence Community. He is currently executive director of the Terror Asymmetrics Project on Strategy, Tactics, and Radical Ideologies (TAPSTRI), Hudson, New York, USA.