Social Choice And Democracy - Schofield Norman | Libro Springer 12/2011 -

home libri books ebook dvd e film top ten sconti 0 Carrello

Torna Indietro

schofield norman - social choice and democracy

Social Choice and Democracy

Disponibilità: Normalmente disponibile in 15 giorni

97,98 €
93,08 €

Questo prodotto usufruisce delle SPEDIZIONI GRATIS
selezionando l'opzione Corriere Veloce in fase di ordine.

Pagabile anche con 18App Bonus Cultura e Carta del Docente

Facebook Twitter Aggiungi commento

Spese Gratis


Lingua: Inglese


Pubblicazione: 12/2011
Edizione: Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1985


The mathematical theory of voting has intellectual roots extending back two centuries to the writings of Borda and Condorcet. Yet it has only been in the last forty years that general theorems have begun to emerge. With the publication of this volume, Norman Schofield brings the results together in a ,common framework. SOCIAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRACY, however, is not merely a synthetic exercise, for Schofield's own work over the last decade has constituted a major initiative in deepening and' broadening our general understanding of voting arrangements. At last the results of his research, bits and pieces of which have been reported in a number of journals of international standing and in various collections, are coherently and systematically presented as an entirety. For students of democracy -- chiefly philosophers and political scientists, but increasingly economists as well -- the insights of this volume are profound. From it I infer the following.


1: Introduction.- 1.1. Rational Choice.- 1.2. The Theory of Social Choice.- 1.3. Restrictions on the Set of Alternatives.- 1.4. Structural Stability of the Core.- 2: Social Choice.- 2.1. Preference Relations.- 2.2. Social Preference Functions.- 2.3. Arrowian Impossibility Theorems.- 2.4. Power and Rationality.- 2.5. Choice and Functions.- 3: Voting Rules.- 3.1. Simple Binary Preference Functions.- 3.2. Acyclic Voting Rules on Restricted Sets of Alternatives.- 3.3. Manipulation of Choice Functions on Finite Sets of Alternatives.- 3.4. Restrictions on the Preferences of Society.- 4: The Core.- 4.1. Existence of a Choice.- 4.2. Existence of a Core in Low Dimensions.- 4.3. Convex Preferences.- 4.4. Non-Convex Preference.- 4.5. The Necessity of the Dimension Constraint.- 5: Local Cycles.- 5.1. Voting Cycles in Dimension v(?)—1.- 5.2. Implementation of Choice Functions in Dimension v(?) — 1.- 5.3. Cycles and the Stability Dimension.- 5.4. The Stability Dimension v*( ?).- 6: Structural Stability.- 6.1. Plott Symmetry Conditions.- 6.2. Structural Stability of the Optima Set.- 6.3. Structural Instability of the Optima Set.- 6.4. Stability of the Core and of Cycles.- 7: Classification of Voting Rules.- 7.1. The Stability and Instability Dimensions.- 7.2. Voting Rules in Low Dimensions.- 7.3. Majority Rule with an Infinite Electorate.- 8: Democratic Theory.- 8.1. Liberalism and Populism.- 8.2. Populist Democracy and Institutionalism.- 8.3. Liberal Theory and Electoral Politics.- 8.4. Preferences and Beliefs.- Glossary of Concepts.- Index of Authors.- Index of Terms and Definitions.

i libri che interessano a chi ha i tuoi gusti

Altre Informazioni



Condizione: Nuovo
Dimensioni: 235 x 155 mm Ø 522 gr
Formato: Brossura
Pagine Arabe: 326
Pagine Romane: xviii

Utilizziamo i cookie di profilazione, anche di terze parti, per migliorare la navigazione, per fornire servizi e proporti pubblicità in linea con le tue preferenze. Se vuoi saperne di più o negare il consenso a tutti o ad alcuni cookie clicca qui. Chiudendo questo banner o proseguendo nella navigazione acconsenti all’uso dei cookie.