Edizione: Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1995
In Representational Ideas: From Plato to Patricia Churchland Watson argues that all intelligible theories of representation by ideas are based on likeness between representations and objects. He concludes that 17th century materialist criticisms of `having' mental representations in the mind apply to contemporary material representations in the brain, as proposed by neurophilosophers. The argument begins with Plato, with particular stress on Descartes, Malebranche, and Arnauld. He then proceeds with an examination of the picture theory developed by Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Goodman, and concludes with an examination of Patricia Churchland, Ruth Millikan, Robert Cummins, and Mark Rollins. The use of the historical development of representationalism to pose a central problem in contemporary cognitive science is unique. For students, scholars and researchers in neuroscience, cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and modern philosophy.
Preface. 1: Introduction. 1. Appearance and Reality. 2. Representational Ideas. 3. Platonic Ideas. 4. Aristotelean Forms. 5. Like Knows Like. 6. Ideas as Effects and Things as Causes. 7. Resemblance. 8. Ontological Models. 2: Descartes. 1. Image and Concept. 2. Imagination and Understanding. 3. Sensations and Images. 4. Non-Resembling Ideas. 5. The Priority of Ontology. 6. What Is an Idea? 7. What in an Idea Makes It be of Its Object? 8. Summary Conclusion. 3: Malebranche and Arnauld. 1. Faculties, Capacities, and Dispositions. 2. Act, Content, and Object. 3. Ideas as Independent Objects. 4. Ideas as Acts of Mind. 5. Ideas as Transparent, as Searchlights, and as Grapples. 4: Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. 1. Primary and Secondary Ideas. 2. Non-Representational Ideas. 3. Particular Ideas. 5: The Picture Theory. 1. Wittgenstein. 2. Carnap. 3. Goodman. 6: Neurophilosophy. 1. Patricia Churchland. 2. Ruth Millikan. 3. Robert Cummins. 4. Mark Rollins. 7: Having Ideas. 8: Conclusion. Bibliography. Index.
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