Reasoning New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking

Philosophers have always recognized the value of reason, but the process of reasoning itself has only recently begun to emerge as a philosophical topic in its own right. Is reasoning a distinctive kind of mental process? If so, what is its nature? How does reasoning differ from merely freely associating thoughts? What is the relationship between reasoning about what to believe and reasoning about how to act? Is reasoning itself something you do, or something that happens to you? And what is the value of reasoning? Are there rules for good or correct reasoning and, if so, what are they like? Does good reasoning always lead to justified belief or rational action? Is there more than one way to reason correctly from your evidence? This volume comprises twelve new essays by leading researchers in the philosophy of reasoning that together address these questions and many more, and explore the connections between them.

1 - Introduction
2 - Inference without Reckoning
3 - A Linking Belief is Not Essential for Reasoning
4 - Attitudes in Active Reasoning
5 - The Question of Practical Reason
5 - Is Reasoning a Form of Agency?
7 - Inference, Agency and Responsibility
8 - Isolating Correct Reasoning
9 - Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules
10 - With Power Comes Responsibility: Cognitive Capacities and Rational Requirements
11 - When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently
12 - The Epistemic Innocence of Optimistically Biased Beliefs
13 - Sovereign Agency

Magdalena Balcerak Jackson is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami. She works in philosophy of mind, epistemology and the philosophy of language and on the intersections of these areas. Her publications focus on the nature and the epistemology of various cognitive capacities, such as imagination, perception, understanding, and reasoning. She has worked at universities in Germany, Australia and the USA. Brendan Balcerak Jackson is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami. He works in philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics. His publications address foundational problems in the philosophy of language, questions about linguistic understanding, meta-metaphysics, and disagreement, as well as questions about rationality and norms of reasoning. He has worked at universities in Australia, Germany and the USA.