Incentives, Organization, and Public Economics Papers in Honour of Sir James Mirrlees

This volume celebrates the career of Nobel Laureate Sir James Mirrlees. The contributions are all by leading authorities and range over Mirrlees' fields of interest: the economics of information, welfare, taxation, project appraisal, and industrial organization. The book will appeal to a wide audience of economists working in microeconomic theory.

This collection celebrates the career of Sir James Mirrlees, who received the 1996 Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on income taxation and its extension to information and incentive problems. His contributions have proved fundamental to the development of a wide range of areas in economics. The 17 papers contained in this volume focus on themes that are representative of Mirrlees' work, including the economics of information, welfare, taxation, project appraisal, and industrial organization. All the contributors have spent time working closely with Mirrlees - either as his co-author or his student - and all are recognized authorities in their fields. The significant new contributions that this collection offers will have wide-ranging appeal, and should prove particularly interesting to scholars working in the areas of microeconomics, microeconomic theory, mathematical economics, and welfare economics.

1 - Introduction
2 - Corporate Diversification and Agency
3 - Adverse Selection and Insurance with uberrima fides
4 - Strategic Experimentation: the Undiscounted Case
5 - Approximate Common Knowledge in a Search Model
6 - Wealth and Welfare
7 - Adjusting One's Standard of Living: Two-Period Models
8 - Who Should Provide Public Goods?
9 - An Optimal Earnings Schedule
10 - Non-linear Utility Pricing and Targeting the Poor
11 - A Reconsideration of the Optimal Income Tax
12 - Reassessing the Diamond-Mirrlees Efficiency Theorem
13 - Valuing Our Future: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Sustainability
14 - Chinese Reforms from a Comparative Perspective
15 - Capital Structure and Imperfect Competition in Product Markets
16 - Repeated Oligopoly Interaction
17 - Competing against Bundles
18 - On the Optimal Location of Capital