Immunity to Error through Misidentification New Essays

Immunity to error through misidentification is recognised as an important feature of certain kinds of first-person judgments, as well as arguably being a feature of other indexical or demonstrative judgments. In this collection of newly commissioned essays, the contributors present a variety of approaches to it, engaging with historical and empirical aspects of the subject as well as contemporary philosophical work. It is the first collection of essays devoted exclusively to the topic and will be essential reading for anyone interested in philosophical work on the self, first-person thought or indexical thought more generally.

1. On the thesis that 'I' is not a referring term John Campbell; 2. Which 'key to all mythologies' about the self? - A note on where the illusions of transcendence come from and how to resist them Annalisa Coliva; 3. Two takes on the de se Marina Folescu and James Higginbotham; 4. Immunity to error as an artefact of transition between representational media Jenann Ismael; 5. Two uses of 'I' as subject? Béatrice Longuenesse; 6. Immunity to error through misidentification: what does it tell us about the de se? Daniel Morgan; 7. Action and immunity to error through misidentification Lucy O'Brien; 8. Explaining de se phenomena Christopher Peacocke; 9. Sources of immunity to error through misidentification Simon Prosser; 10. Immunity to error through misidentification: what it is and where it comes from François Recanati; 11. I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject Galen Strawson; 12. Bodily immunity to error Frédérique de Vignemont; 13. Reflections on François Recanati's 'Immunity to error through misidentification: what it is and where it comes from' Crispin Wright.

Immunity to error through misidentification is an important feature of certain kinds of first-person judgments, as well as arguably being a feature of other indexical or demonstrative judgments. In this book, the contributors use a variety of approaches, engaging with historical and empirical aspects as well as contemporary philosophy.

Simon Prosser is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of St Andrews. His research involves a variety of issues in the philosophy of mind and in metaphysics.
François Recanati is a senior researcher at the CNRS, Institut Jean-Nicod, and an Arché Professorial Fellow at the University of St Andrews. His recent publications include Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (2010), Perspectival Thought (2007) and Literal Meaning (Cambridge University Press, 2004).