Competition and Monopoly in the Federal Reserve System, 1914-1951 A Microeconomic Approach to Monetary History

Competition among central banks in a monetary union is thought to result in an over issue problem, which has its roots in the view that moneys produced by competitive central banks are perfect substitutes for each other. In the conventional set-up over issue can be overcome by granting a central bank exclusive rights to conduct monetary policy. In this book Mark Toma explores the workings of the early Federal Reserve System as a basis for challenging the conventional wisdom. He is able to show that competition among reserve banks in the 1920s did not result in an issue of Fed money. Rather the main effect of competitive structure was to cause reserve banks to make substantial interest payments to the private banking system in place of transfers to the US government. The book emphasizes the evolution of the Federal Reserve from a competitive to a monopolistic structure.

List of figures; List of tables; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Microeconomics of the reserve industry; 3. Peculiar economics of the founding of the Fed; 4. Interest on reserves and reserve smoothing in a correspondent banking system; 5. Competitive open market operations; 6. High tide of the Federal Reserve System?; 7. The Fed, executive branch, and public finance, 1934–9; 8. World War II financing; 9. Historical lessons; Notes; References; Index.

This book focuses on the Federal Reserve Board from its founding in 1914 to the Treasury Accord of 1951. Rooted in the public choice tradition, it emphasizes the microeconomics of the central banking industry and provides insights into the conduct of the Fed policy and the role of central banks.